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Abstract  
This article presents the case for the need for a re-think in the prevailing orthodoxy of measurement 
approaches in the governance and management of public services. The paper explores the 
simplification of complex reality that Outcomes Based Performance Management (OBPM) requires 
in order to function, and the consequences of such simplification. It examines the evidence for and 
against the effectiveness of OBPM, and argues that both sets of evidence can be brought into a 
single explanatory story by understanding the theory of OBPM. The simplification required to 
measure and attribute ‘outcomes’ turns the organisation and delivery of social interventions into a 
game, the rules of which promote gamesmanship, distorting the behaviour of organisations, 
managers and practitioners who undertake it.  
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Introduction  
The management of the performance of public services is a significant topic for social policy and 
management scholars. From the 1980s onwards questions began to be raised in the UK about the 
continuing expansion of the state. This led to a move from what has been described as an era of 
professional autonomy coupled with bureaucratic systems, to an approach where the focus moved 
toward efficiency in the production of public services. This became known as “New Public 
Management” (NPM) (Hood 1991).  NPM was later summarized by Ferlie et al. (1996) as 'three Ms': 
Markets, Managers and Measurement.  The measurement element, which forms one of the key 
planks of NPM, foregrounded a way of thinking in which ‘Accountability’ and ‘Performance 
Management’ were key and led to significant changes to the way in which public service delivery 
was organized (Lapsley 2008).   
This paper will argue that the current evolution of the measurement element of NPM - Outcomes-
Based Performance Management (OBPM), which has become the key mechanism for the 
implementation of accountability and performance management, turns the performance 
management of social interventions into a simplified game, which does not deal well with the 
complex reality of life. (We will generally use the term ‘social interventions’ rather than ‘public 
services’, as a significant element of this work is devised and delivered by organisations which are 
not public sector bodies).  
The paper will explore the evidence which has been generated in response to the question: is OBPM 
effective? It will argue that the evidence which demonstrates that targets improve performance data 
and the evidence which suggests OBPM undermines effective practice are both valid, and that they 
can be brought into a single explanatory narrative by understanding the theoretical assumptions 
which underpin OBPM, and the flaws that these contain. It will construct this explanatory framework 
by exploring the theoretical assumptions which underpin OBPM, and argue that the processes of 
simplification demanded by the theory of OBPM turn the design and delivery of social interventions 
into a game which requires certain tactics in order to be played most effectively. 
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What is Outcomes Based Performance Management (OBPM)? 
OBPM is an umbrella term for using “outcomes” as a way of making judgement about the 
performance and effectiveness of social policy interventions (Lowe 2013).  It suggests that the 
effectiveness of social policy interventions should be judged on the basis of the impact they make in 
the lives of the people for whom they are designed, and that those people and organisations who 
deliver these interventions should have their performance rewarded or punished on the basis of 
whether desired “outcomes” are occurring. (Bovaird 2012, Centre for Social Justice 2011, UK Cabinet 
Office 2012). 
The appeal of OPBM is obvious – it is supposed to focus the attention of those delivering social 
policy interventions on those whom they serve. As one proponent states: the “clear and compelling 
answer to the question of ‘Why measure outcomes?’ is: To see if programs really make a difference 
in the lives of people.” (United Way of America 1996: 4) 
During the period in which OBPM initially became popular it represented an evolution in thinking 
about performance management which moved it on from measuring either the inputs into a service 
(e.g. how many staff are employed to do a task) or the outputs of that service - the amount of 
provision that is offered (e.g. the number of classes offered on a learning programme). Different 
forms of OBPM have emerged over time. It began in the 1990s as “Outcomes-Based Evaluation”, 
pioneered, amongst others, by Robert Schalock (see, for example, Schalock 2001), before moving 
into the broader field of performance management, where it became known as “Management by 
Results” (Perrin 1998). It is now widely known through Mark Friedman’s programme of “Results 
Based Accountability” TM (Friedman 2001 - also known as “Outcome Based Accountability”).  Most 
recently, OBPM is the basis of Payment by Results (PbR) and Social Impact Bonds, in which people 
(or more commonly organisations) are paid by the “outcomes” that they deliver. (UK Cabinet Office 
2012, National Audit Office 2015). This is the logical conclusion of the OBPM model, in which the 
financial rewards for people and organisations are tightly coupled to the delivery of agreed 
“outcomes”. 
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Is OBPM effective? 
Research into the effectiveness of OBPM approaches has generally fallen into one of two camps. In 
the first camp, researchers have explored the impact of performance targets on the performance of 
those who undertake social interventions (mostly public services) (see, for example, Boyne and Chen 
2006, Boyne 2010, Kelman and Friedman 2009). This is largely quantitative research, which 
undertakes large-scale econometric analysis of performance data. It has produced results which 
have been interpreted as supporting the proposition that OBPM is effective. 
In the second camp, researchers have explored the impact of performance targets on the practice of 
those who commission, manage and deliver social interventions. (See for example: Bevan & Hood 
2006b; Perrin 1998; Mayne 2007; van Theeil & Leuww 2002; Rothstein 2008; Newton 2012; Soss, 
Fording & Schram 2011; Keevers et al 2012). This is largely qualitative research, based on interviews 
with those who undertake the work. It finds that OBPM distorts and undermines the practice of 
social interventions – this distortion is often called ‘gaming’ (e.g. Bevan and Hood 2006b). 
Let us explore the evidence produced by these two camps in turn. 
Evidence supporting OBPM 
Our departure point for this exploration will be Boyne's (2010) piece, which asks whether 
performance management works. (Although, Boyne does not use the term ‘Outcomes Based 
Performance Management’, it is clear that he is referring to this idea, as he describes “the central 
purpose of these initiatives has been unchanging: to improve public management and program 
outcomes” (Boyne 2010: 209) and he describes the three elements of performance management as 
“selecting indicators, setting targets, and taking action to influence scores on the indicators and the 
extent of target achievement” (Boyne 2010: 209). 
Boyne (2010: 223) concludes that “the balance of the empirical evidence is consistent with the meta-
proposition that performance management is associated with better public services.” 
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In order to reach this conclusion, he draws on a variety of studies, including his own study of the 
effects of target based performance on Local Authorities (Boyne and Chen 2006). Boyne and Chen 
(2006) find that: 
“The results show that authorities with a target performed better than their peers in the LPSA 
period and better than themselves in the pre-LPSA period. This evidence supports the view that 
setting a target on a performance indicator leads to better outcomes, at least as measured by 
exam results in the education service.” (Boyne and Chen, 2006: 472) 
They reach this conclusion by undertaking econometric analysis of the performance of English Local 
Authorities against different kinds of target. In addition, they analyse the figures to see if they 
contain evidence of particular types of gaming. They conclude that they do not: 
“The insignificant coefficients for this variable imply that target effects have not been achieved 
by ‘‘cream skimming’’ in the selection of pupils for exams. This does not exclude the possibility 
of other effects of targets on equity. For example, local authorities may have improved the 
percentage of pupils achieving five or more GCSEs at grades A*–C by concentrating their efforts 
on those just below this level, thereby neglecting pupils far above or below the threshold of 
LPSA success. This is ‘‘milking the middle’’ rather than cream skimming but raises equity issues 
that require investigation in future studies of target effects.” (Boyne and Chen, 2006: 474) 
Kelman and Friedman (2009) come to similar conclusions by undertaking an econometric analysis of 
performance data relating to NHS waiting time targets. Their starting point is to examine the 
measurement of results of waiting-time target indicators. These waiting time indicators demonstrate 
significant improvement during the period in which the Government made waiting times a key 
performance target for hospitals. Based on previous qualitative evidence about the distorting effects 
of targets, they then construct and test scenarios within the data which might suggest that such 
improvements were due to ‘gaming’ rather than genuine service improvement: 
“First, we discuss theoretically— using literature from public management, economics, 
organization theory, and accounting— why one might expect dysfunctional responses to 
adoption of performance measures in an organization and what the different categories of 
such distortions might be. We illustrate this with examples of distortions predicted for the 
English A&E wait-time performance target. Second, we present empirical results, based on 
econometric analysis of data from all English hospitals during the period 2003–2006, on 
presence of the predicted dysfunctional effects. We find no evidence of these dysfunctional 
responses. Indeed, in a number of cases , the sign of statistically significant effects predicted 
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by those worried about dysfunctional effects went in the ‘‘wrong’’ direction, that is, that 
better wait-time performance was associated with a lower level of problems predicted by a 
dysfunctional effects story.” – (Kelman and Friedman 2009: 919) 
 
Furthermore, in addition to challenging the idea that such improvements were due to gaming, the 
authors identify examples of practice improvements which could plausibly be responsible for the 
improvement. (Kelman and Friedman 2009: 939) 
Drawing together the evidence presented by Boyne (2010), Boyne and Chen (2006) and Kelman and 
Friedman (2009), we can reach the following conclusions: 
Conclusion 1: The combination of increased resources and performance targets for 
services improves the performance data around those targets 
Conclusion 2: Analysis of this performance data does not support the claim that it has 
been produced via certain types of large-scale gaming 
Conclusion 3: The introduction of performance targets may have, in some cases, led to 
improved practice 
We will now consider the range of evidence which highlights the problems associated with OBPM. 
Evidence against OBPM 
The evidence against OBPM suggests that the adoption of such management techniques changes the 
practice of those who design and undertake social interventions for the worse. Instead of serving the 
needs of their clients, managers and frontline workers become focussed on how to produce the 
required performance information. This evidence is largely based on qualitative interviews with 
public officials, staff and managers. 
A recent example of such research is Soss, Fording & Schram (2011). They conducted a detailed 
study of the behaviour and perspectives of officials, managers and staff who are delivering the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programme in the United States. This programme is 
commissioned and performance managed using a PbR framework which disciplines all those 
involved with the programme, both staff and those in receipt of support. 
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They found that the OBPM regime: 
 Focuses staff time on the production of data, rather than supporting clients (Soss, Fording & 
Schram 2011: 221) 
 Encourages managers to employ people with data-processing skills, rather than those with 
the skills needed to support vulnerable people (Soss, Fording & Schram 2011: 221) 
 Encourage managers to find ways to meet performance targets which are not based on 
improving service to clients  Soss, Fording & Schram 2011: 211/12) 
 Encourages staff at all levels to behave perversely, subverting the stated ambition of the 
programme.  (Soss, Fording & Schram 2011: 207/8) 
All these effects are summarised as follows: 
“In the WT program, performance is the name of the game for local service providers. But 
organizations typically adapt in perverse ways, and internal contradictions embedded in the 
NPM work systematically against policy learning and program improvement” (Soss, Fording 
& Schram 2011: 212) 
A similar picture was found in a study of the implementation of Results Based Accountability TM in 
Australia (Keevers et al. 2012). This study is significant because it is one of the few which has 
undertaken an in-depth ‘before and after’ look at how the introduction of Results Based 
Accountability affected the practices of frontline staff within social support organisations.  It found 
that following the introduction of a Results Based Accountability reporting system, staff spend time 
collecting and analysing data about those young people rather than spending time developing and 
maintaining the quality of relationships which are the cornerstone of their work with young people 
(Keevers et al. 2012: 114). 
The negative effects of the OBPM regime can clearly be seen from the way in which the workers 
describe its impact on their practice: 
“It’s constantly looking at numbers. Yeah, and the quality and depth of the client contact has 
really declined in the last couple of months because of the pressure of the new data and 
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monitoring requirements. We don’t get the funding unless we meet the targets. It’s really 
changed the way we work. … If a young person was having problems with transport or 
anything like that we would go and meet the client. We would either go to where they were 
staying and do the assessment there, or we’d take them somewhere where they felt more 
comfortable, so we might meet them at McDonalds or something like that. Now we can’t – 
we can’t do any of that because we have to enter information onto the computer as soon as 
they come in. And they [funding body] have either booked us an appointment right after or 
there is not enough space between times to drop them off and pick them up. (reflective 
discussion)” (Keevers at al 2012: 114) 
Such accounts of the way in which OBPM regimes serve to shape the thinking of those who work 
under them add depth and detail to other research with staff at all levels who have been involved 
with OBPM mechanisms. Together, this research suggests that in order to produce the required 
data, people ‘game the system’ in various ways: creaming & parking, teaching to the test, 
reclassifying, and falsification of data. These studies find this same ‘gaming’ activity in a huge variety 
of policy settings, across a range of different places (Bevan & Hood 2006b – UK, Health Service; 
Perrin 1998 – USA and Canada, employment programmes; van Theeil & Leuww 2002 – Europe & 
USA, public services; Rothstein 2008 – USA, education; Newton 2012: UK, employment programmes) 
The conclusion that we are able to draw from this range of research is that, when interviewed, 
managers and staff from a range of policy contexts across the world who are part of OBPM systems 
tell remarkably similar stories concerning the way in which OBPM impacts on their practice and 
shapes their thinking. This impact is to the detriment of the quality and effectiveness of the services 
that they are delivering. 
Bringing the evidence together: creating a single explanatory narrative 
How can it be that, across a wide range of policy and geographical contexts, interviews with 
managers and staff reveal such consistent stories of the dysfunctional impact of OBPM, and yet 
those who have searched for the evidence of such effects in the performance data itself find no 
evidence of such behaviour? How can large-scale quantitative analysis suggest that performance 
data improves for reasons that aren’t associated with gaming, whilst interviews with practitioners 
suggest that gaming is routine? 
9 
 
There seem to be two potential ways to address the conflicting nature of this evidence: 
Option 1: To dismiss one or other set of evidence as incorrect 
Option 2: To find a single narrative that explains both sets of evidence 
Option 1: Dismissal 
It is tempting to attempt to dismiss either one set of evidence or the other. Kelman and Friedman 
(2009: 938) go some way down this road by describing the evidence for gaming within OBPM as 
“anecdotal”. Having dismissed the qualitative evidence in this way, they construct an explanation for 
why gaming patterns do not appear in their data: “(1) complementarity across performance 
dimensions and (2) ways that dysfunctional responses become self-limiting, (3) management 
behaviors to limit dysfunctional responses.” (Kelman and Friedman 2009: 938) 
Similarly, if we wanted to point methodological fingers at the quantitative evidence supporting 
OBPM, we could start by exploring whether the statistical techniques used have high levels of 
explanatory power (there are questions about this) and one could also suggest that the attempts to 
construct scenarios which would suggest gaming are limited in scope and imagination (for example, 
looking at only alternative scenario per gaming hypothesis to seek evidence of gaming). 
However, the weight of evidence on both sides would seem to suggest that such efforts are not a 
sensible way to proceed. There is enough similarity between the stories told by both types of 
evidence (and gathered from a variety of places and policy areas) to suggest that each should be 
taken at face value. 
Option 2: Creating a single explanatory narrative 
What is required is to create an explanatory narrative that makes sense of both sets of evidence and 
unites them into a single explanatory framework. We will approach this task by exploring the 
theoretical assumptions which underpin OBPM, and using this theoretical understanding to 
reinterpret the evidence about OBPM. These two assumptions are: 
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Assumption 1: Outcomes can be measured for the purpose of performance management 
Assumption 2: Outcomes are created by (and are attributable to) the interventions of particular 
programmes or organisations 
 
Assumption 1: Outcomes can be measured for the purpose of performance management 
We can begin this exploration by asking the question ‘How do we know if an outcome has been 
achieved?’ Measuring outcomes is a complicated, resource-intensive business. Schalock (2001: 75)  
identifies the following elements of effective outcome measurement: methodological pluralism, user 
designed surveys and interviews, the use of control groups and lengthy post-programme longitudinal 
follow up – 22 months is considered to be a “short” period of follow up (Schalock 2001: 93) 
This is because people’s lives, and the context in which they live them, are complex. Understanding 
the impact of a social policy intervention requires a level of familiarity with the detail of peoples’ 
lives as they are lived that only comes from intensive research. Understanding an “outcome” means 
understanding how it fits into the life of the person experiencing it, as each person will have their 
own perspective on what the desired outcome looks like.  This is well illustrated by Widdershiven 
and Sohl (1999) who use narrative-based evaluation to highlight how the desired outcome of 
“autonomy for people with learning disabilities” is perceived very differently by each actor within a 
particular support programme. 
However, this is not how “outcomes” are actually measured within OBPM. If organisations or 
programmes delivering social policy interventions were required to genuinely measure the 
outcomes of their work on the lives of those they supported, it would cost more to monitor and 
evaluate those programmes than it would cost to deliver them. As an illustration, Donald Campbell 
cites research undertaken into the impact of introducing a minimum-income guarantee for American 
households. Researchers wanted to know whether this achieved positive outcomes for the families, 
and crucially, whether it impacted on their motivation to look for work. A minimum income 
guarantee programme was delivered to 300 families, with a further 300 acting as a control group. 
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The programme itself cost US$3 million to deliver. The research cost a further US$5 million 
(Campbell 1976: 35).  
The conclusion to draw from this theory and practice is that genuine research into outcomes is 
prohibitively expensive. Therefore, rather than undertake rigorous research into whether outcomes 
have been achieved, organisations/programmes adopt an alternative strategy, which is to use 
simple, easy-to-collect data to stand as a proxy for genuine outcome information (Friedman 2001: 
Section 3.7). 
We can see the results of this thinking in action in some of the recently developed outcomes-
frameworks in the UK. The ASCOT (The Adult Social Care Outcomes Toolkit) uses a simple four 
question survey format to determine people’s needs and desired outcomes. For example, in order to 
gather information about the desired outcome that “The service user feels he/she has a nutritious, 
varied and culturally appropriate diet with enough food and drink he/she enjoys at regular and 
timely intervals” the following question is posed (see Figure 1 Extract from ASCOT questionnaire 
instrument below by Netten et al. 2011) 
Figure 1: Example question from ASCOT toolkit 
Similarly, it is why Body Mass Index (BMI) is used as a proxy measure for obesity. Despite the 
National Obesity Observatory (2009: 3) stating that BMI is a problematic proxy measure because it 
ignores “factors such as fitness (muscle mass), ethnic origin and puberty” and that it “does not 
provide any indication of the distribution of body fat and does not fully adjust for the effects of 
height or body shape” it still recommends using BMI as a proxy. The National Obesity Observatory 
(2009: 2) states: 
“BMI is an attractive measure because it is an easy, cheap and non-invasive means of 
assessing excess body fat. True measures of body fat are impractical or expensive to use at 
population level (e.g. bioelectrical impedance analysis or hydro densitometry), and other 
proxy measures of body fat are difficult to measure accurately and consistently across large 
populations (e.g. skin fold thickness or waist circumference).” 
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So, we have quickly moved from a position where large scale rigorous research is required to 
understand outcomes in people’s lives, to one in which OBPM is undertaken using simple data 
collection via questionnaire or whatever measure can be used to capture information simply and 
easily. An “outcome” is not a measure of impact in an individual’s life. Instead, an “outcome” 
becomes what is measurable. As Friedman (2001: 3.3) says, “If we had a thousand measures, we 
could still not fully capture the health and readiness of young children. We use data to approximate 
these conditions and to stand as proxies for them.” 
This exploration has shown that the assumption that outcomes can be measured for the purpose of 
performance management rests on a process of simplification and abstraction. It is not possible to 
measure outcomes as they are experienced in the complexity of human lives. Instead, people 
measure what is measurable and call that an ‘outcome’. 
Let us explore the second assumption: 
Assumption 2: Outcomes are created by (and are attributable to) the interventions of 
particular programmes or organisations 
We will begin by asking the question: What is ‘an outcome’? An outcome is a snapshot of the state 
of affairs in the world, as seen from the perspective of a particular person or group of people. The 
state of affairs in the world – whether that person has a job, whether they have re-offended, or 
continue to have substance misuse problems – is produced by the interaction of an enormous range 
of factors. This can be illustrated by looking at obesity. Whether someone is obese, or not, is exactly 
the kind of complex outcome with which social policy concerns itself. Researchers have mapped the 
range of factors which contribute to whether people are obese, and how they interact with one 
another (see Figure 2 Systems Map of Obesity below from Vandenbroeck et al.  2007: 74) 
Figure 2: Systems map of obesity 
This map demonstrates the staggering complexity of interactions that lead to ‘an outcome’.  Not 
only do each of the individual factors relate in a complex way, but the relationship of each factor to 
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the whole system is complex. Such systems are described as “non-linear”, meaning “a system whose 
output is not proportional to its input… Here we can have changes in effects which are 
disproportionate to changes in the causal elements(s).” (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014: 18). Such systems 
exhibit “general deterministic chaos where very small variations in the input parameters can 
generate very different output values in a system of equations.” (Byrne & Callaghan 2014: 19). 
Complex systems such as these demonstrate emergent properties. That is, the outcomes that are 
produced by such systems are not predictable from their starting properties.  (Byrne & Callaghan 
2014: 21). 
We can therefore see that outcomes are emergent properties of complex, non-linear systems. It is 
untenable to claim that an outcome is created by any one organisation or programme (or even a 
combination of organisations/programmes). They are the result of the operation of the entire 
system – a system which not only includes the individual, but also that individual’s interaction with 
wider society, as Christakis and Fowler (2009) have identified in what they describe as the connected 
network effect namely: “Your Friends’ Friends Can Make You Fat”. 
The key feature of complex systems is that they produce non-repeatable results (Snowden 2003). A 
person or organisation might act in exactly the same way on two different occasions, but their 
actions will lead to completely different outcomes, because of the way in which their activities 
interacted with the whole system.  Therefore the same intervention delivered to two different 
people, or to the same person, but at different times, may well have a completely different 
outcome. As a consequence of this complexity, outcomes cannot be reliably attributed to 
interventions (Mowles 2014). 
It may be thought that regression analysis can address this issue. Indeed, this is precisely the 
solution that Schalock (2001: 68) recommends to the problem of attributing outcomes to particular 
interventions. However, this is not a viable answer, as regression analysis can only use known 
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elements to which variables were assigned at the start of a study – meaning that all the important 
variables would need to be known in advance. Secondly, even if all the important variables could be 
known, using regression analysis within complex systems is exceptionally challenging: 
“The development of regression models which have so dominated quantitative social 
sciences of a non-experimental form… is completely predicated on straightforward linear 
modelling and efforts to get beyond this by deploying non-linear equation systems…have 
been, with some exceptions, generally unsuccessful. The blunt point is that non-linearity is a 
product of emergence. We need to start from emergence and develop a science that fits 
that crucial aspect of complex reality.” (Byrne and Callaghan 2014: 6/7)  
How then does OBPM deal with the problem of attributing outcomes to causes in complex systems? 
As with the previous assumption, the answer is by a process of simplification – by using simple 
(linear) models to map cause and effect. As Bovaird (2012: 6) points out “More generally, the 
attribution problem tends to be tackled (where it is not simply ignored) through reference to ‘cause-
and-effect chain’ models.” 
Rather than seeing outcomes as emergent properties of complex systems, OBPM conceptualizes 
them as products of simple, linear “programme logic” models. Schalock and Bonham (2003: 231) 
give a classic example of a Programme Logic model as the recommended way of conceptualising the 
process of creating outcomes. This is shown in Figure 3 below: 
Figure 3: A programme logic model template 
This simplification is required in order to achieve OBPM’s management objective: to identify and 
reward those people and organisations that are producing the desired results. A logic model enables 
outcomes to be viewed as the product of a particular sequence of interventions in the life of a 
person or group. Outcome X is the product of undertaking intervention Y on person or group Z. This 
is a linear model.  As well as following the line forward from inputs to outcomes, the causal line can 
(and should) be read the other way, working backwards from desired outcomes to the interventions 
which create them. As Friedman (2001: 1.1) says ““Results decision-making uses results (the desired 
conditions of well-being) as the starting point for making decisions. It is a business-like process that 
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starts with ends and works backwards to means. It first defines success in measurable terms and 
uses those measures to gauge success or failure.” 
There is some recognition within OBPM thinking that the real world does not function in these linear 
ways.  Mayne, in his study (2007: 95), highlights that “Outcomes are by definition results over which 
organizations do not have complete control”. It is also recognised by Friedman (2001: 1.1): “the 
more important the performance measure… the less control the program has over it. This is a 
paradox at the heart of doing performance measurement well”.  
However, the response from OBPM is to say that lack of control doesn’t matter. As Friedman (2001: 
1.1) says, when discussing what people should be held accountable for “Don't accept lack of control 
as an excuse… If control were the overriding criteria for performance measures then there would be 
no performance measures at all.” From this, we can see that the overriding priority is the process of 
simplification – whatever it takes to simplify reality until it fits the OBPM model, this is what must 
happen. 
Understanding the evidence – a new way to understand ‘gaming’ 
Unpicking the theoretical assumptions which underpin OBPM enables us to identify that OBPM faces 
two key problems (1) most outcomes cannot be authentically measured without incurring 
prohibitive costs and (2) outcomes are not created by, nor attributable to, particular interventions. 
At the root of both of these problems is a failure to accept the complexity of life as it is lived by real 
people. OBPM requires simplicity in order to be possible. It demands that outcomes are measurable 
and attributable, without this, it cannot function, as the UK’s National Audit Office identified in its 
recent analysis of PbR programmes: 
“The nature of PbR means it is most likely to succeed if the operating environment has 
certain features, for example results that can be measured and attributed to providers’ 
interventions. If PbR is applied inappropriately there is a risk that either service quality or 
value for money may be undermined.” (National Audit Office 2015) 
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OBPM is possible only under a very limited range of conditions, conditions where the outcomes that 
people experience are easily measurable, and are created within simple, linear systems which enable 
attribution. Under all other conditions, the world must be drastically simplified in or order to make 
such performance management possible. Rather than limit OBPM to these rare contexts, those who 
implement OBPM models have, as we have seen, sought to make reality simple. This simplification 
takes the following form (1) substituting proxy measurements for genuine outcome measures (2) 
using linear programme logic models for attribution.  
We can see this effect clearly documented in Keevers’ (2012) description of how organisations 
undertaking complex practices to pursue social justice had that complexity stripped away under 
Results-Based Accountability (RBA) planning processes: 
“This fading of social justice practices to the background is perhaps in part due to RBA planning 
being premised on a representational view of knowledge. Within this ‘representational idiom’, 
Pickering argues, people appear as shadows of themselves and their practices become 
abstracted (1995, p. 6). Certainly, in the RBA planning processes we observed, the participants 
sat at tables using statistical data, graphs and ‘RBA language’ to develop measurable 
performance indicators for each ‘result’. Such activities shifted the conversations away from 
detailed, affective accounts of the rough ground of practice, and in this way the participants 
appeared like Pickering’s ‘disembodied intellects’.” (Keevers at al 2012: 109) 
 
“The specific, situated practice knowledge and attention to young people at risk living well 
and contributing to community life which expresses the distinctive character of practising 
social justice at Southern Youth did not appear on any of the ‘results’ lists we witnessed 
being constructed. The richness, depth and specific character of local practice knowledge 
was bleached out (Iedema, 2003) during intra-action with RBA representational practices, 
resulting in final ‘results’ lists that were generalized and indistinguishable from a generic 
‘results’ list for any human population.” (Keevers at al 2012: 112) 
Understanding this process of simplification enables us to reframe the existing research evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of OBPM. As we have seen, this empirical evidence largely falls into two 
camps: firstly, evidence supporting OBPM, which is mainly econometric analysis of large-scale 
quantitative performance data, and secondly, evidence which identifies the ways in which OBPM 
processes undermine effective practice, which is mainly derived from interviews with those who 
undertake this work. 
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Gamesmanship - playing the Game of OBPM 
We can bring together our theoretical understanding of OBPM together with the research evidence 
to understand why we see the evidence we do. This is a contribution to a growing literature which 
seeks to understand the wider practice and impact of performance management (see for example, 
Pollitt 2013 and Lewis 2015). It is an attempt to conceptualise from the breadth of people’s lived 
experience of performance management, escaping the narrow rationalist, technocratic perspective 
(Lewis 2015: 2).  
The process of simplification and abstraction turns the complex reality of life into a simple game 
(analogous to the way in which a game such as Monopoly is a simple abstraction from real-life 
capitalism). In order to succeed at the OBPM game people are required to produce the appropriate 
performance data. Those who produce the appropriate data are rewarded, those who fail to do so 
are punished. 
The desired purpose behind OBPM is to encourage those who deliver under such regimes to produce 
appropriate performance data by providing effective services to those they support. And, as we have 
seen from the evidence from Kelman and Friedman (2011) this can happen. However, the way in 
which the rules of OBPM game are constructed does not favour this way of playing. Instead, the 
rules favour a different set of tactics. In this section, we will quote extensively from the Soss, Fording 
and Schram (2011) study, because it has the greatest level of detail on this issue. It is worth 
remembering, however, that this picture is repeated across many other studies  (Perrin 1998, Van 
Thiel and Leuww 2002, Bevan and Hood 2006 a and b; Mayne 2007, Newton 2012) 
The process of simplification pretends that what is measured is an “outcome”, and that such 
“outcomes” are under the control of those who are being held accountable for delivering them. 
However, those playing the game at the frontline necessarily engage with reality. They know that 
the genuine impact of the programme is not being captured by proxy measures, and that outcomes 
are emergent properties of complex systems. Those confronted with the disconnect between 
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OBPM’s simplified rules and the complex reality of life must find tactics to reconcile the two. 
Sometimes they struggle with this: 
“They say that we’re not, how would you say it . . . a social service agency in a sense, like 
we’re a business . . . But at the same time . . . you’re working with people who have needs, 
who have barriers, and bringing the two together is very difficult. [. . .] There’s a number 
game that we have to play. And when you bring that into it, it’s hard for me to sit with an 
individual there; they’re telling me that they have all these barriers. For example, they’re 
coming in and they’re telling me that they’ve been evicted from their apartment, they don’t 
have any place to live, they don’t have any food, they don’t have any clothes. And then here 
I am as a case manager you have to participate at 40 hours a week. You know, it’s just kind 
of, it’s crazy!’’ (Soss, Fording and Schram 2011: 220) 
“While RBA planning tools offer simplification and standardization for some stakeholders, 
such tools can create confusion and dilemmas for others (Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 293). 
Practitioners from community organizations struggled to work out how to account for the 
importance of relationships within RBA planning practices.” (Keevers et al 2012: 109) 
As a consequence of being held accountable for outcomes which are beyond their control, staff who 
are involved with the development and delivery of social interventions learn to manage what they 
can control, which is the production of data. We can see this exemplified in the evidence gathered 
by Soss, Fording & Schram (2011:209/10): 
“Finally, when local actors respond to performance pressures, they also confront ‘‘easy 
versus hard’’ paths when deciding whether to focus on improving serve to the existing client 
pool or, alternatively, selecting a client pool that will make it easier to meet performance 
goals. Evidence from all regions in this study suggests that the latter path is usually seen as 
easier. Accordingly, creative efforts to innovate are often directed toward reshaping the 
clientele rather than serving them more effectively” 
“In the WT program, serious reforms designed to deal with problems of poverty and work 
are (not surprisingly) often viewed as difficult to achieve, and their performance effects are 
usually seen as distant and uncertain. It is far easier to change how one classifies existing 
activities and counts measured behaviors. As a result, as one local official told us 
forthrightly, ‘‘people game the numbers all the time.’’ In describing efforts to meet the 
required participation rate, another regional official explained: ‘‘You have to do all sorts of 
things to fill the participation hours. We’ve got a client who we found out was taking her 
pastor to church on Sunday. We went out and asked her pastor to sign on saying this was 
community service. The trick is to find out what people are already doing and find a way to 
count it as work or community service. This is how you have to do it.’’  
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We can model this behaviour to examine the drivers behind the development of this particular set of 
tactics for playing the OBPM game. This model begins to explore the rational drivers underpinning 
the development of tactics needed to play the OBPM game well. Using Figure 4 below we can 
examine the choices faced by staff by placing them along two axes.  Along the horizontal axis staff 
can judge the probability of whether their choices will create an improvement in the results data. 
The vertical axis concerns the cost of adjustments that they can make. Some changes that they make 
will be expensive to implement. Others will be cheaper.  
 
Figure 4: Options for improving results data for staff under an OBPM system 
 
The quadrant that staff will rationally seek to occupy will be the quadrant in which the changes they 
make will have the greatest likelihood of producing the required data, and those which will be 
cheapest to implement. Hence, Quadrant 3: Low cost/certain impact is the most desirable. These are 
the choices that will result in the organisation achieving greater financial return and which will keep 
the overall cost of programme competitive against other organisations who will be tendering for this 
work. 
We can see that all the choices that exist in the ‘best’ quadrant (3) are those that involve ‘gaming’ 
the system.  And these are the choices that have been reported by the evidence from OBPM-
commissioned programmes (Perrin 1998, Van Thiel and Leuww 2002, Bevan and Hood 2006 a and b; 
Mayne 2007, Newton 2012).  This model demonstrates the way in which people under an OBPM 
system are driven towards “the alternative logics of Performance Management” as described by 
Pollitt (2013). 
The drivers for making these choices are felt keenly by staff:  
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“The stress felt by case managers can be traced partly to their belief that performance 
numbers matter for job security and trajectory. WT case managers make modest wages in a 
job with few guarantees, and a nontrivial number have previously received welfare 
themselves. They often struggle to make ends meet and, as a result, tend to view 
performance through the prism of their own anxieties as breadwinners. Few expect to be 
‘‘fired’’ if their numbers drop. But in a system of for-profit contracting, most are keenly 
aware that performance numbers drive profits, and declining profits could lead their current 
employer to downsize the staff or even to sell the operation to another company whose 
retention of old employees is uncertain. At a less absolute level, most expect that if they 
produce weak numbers, they will be subjected to greater supervision in a way that will make 
their work more stressful and harder to do. (Soss, Fording and Schram 2011: 221) 
This is the nature of playing the OBPM game. The rules of the game create a rationality which 
favours a set of tactics that have previously been called ‘gaming’. However, all those involved in the 
system are playing a game. The issue is not about game-playing but about the tactics different 
players use. A better term for such tactics would seem to be “gamesmanship” – “the use of dubious 
(although not technically illegal) methods to win or gain a serious advantage in a game” (Wikepedia). 
[With apologies for the use of gender-specific language – “gamespersonship” is just too ugly and 
unwiedly to use.]  
Each person within the game has to find a way to play it that responds to the underlying rationality 
of the rules, but which also responds to the complexity of the real world they encounter. The game 
therefore exists in two separate dimensions: the dimension of simplified rules, and the complex 
reality of life. (Imagine trying to conduct business affairs using the rules of Monopoly). This means 
that the game does not ‘make sense’ but still staff must learn to play it well: 
“The way we’re able to [stay in business and] help people is by making our measurements 
on our red and green reports and getting paid, so that we can therefore in return help with 
childcare and support services [. . .] So the more we make those measurements and those 
goals, the more we can help candidates. But the more we focus on those [performance 
goals], the less we’re focusing on the candidates. So, it’s a catch-22.” (Soss, Fording and 
Schram 2011: 210/11) 
 
It is important to note that “playing the game well” may well involve aspects of delivering the service 
well. It is not impossible to improve performance data by actually improving the service that is 
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offered to clients. It is perfectly possible that this occurs, and indeed is likely to be the case in some 
instances, as the motivations of many of those who do this work are to help those in need: 
‘‘case managers are rarely singleminded performance maximizers. More typically, they are 
ambivalent actors caught in the cross-pressures of competing values, identities, and 
organizational forces (see also, Watkins-Hayes 2009, 2011). Despite the rhetoric of the 
‘‘business model,’’ most express a strong commitment to social service ideals and value their 
identities as providers who are responsive to clients’ needs. As a result, they express deep 
reservations about making case decisions based on performance goals.” (Soss, Fording and 
Schram, 2011: 220) 
Therefore the rational driver to develop tactics which maximise the production of good-looking data 
is tempered by people’s values – their desire to do a good job. However, our model shows that such 
behaviour – actually delivering the service well – is likely to be expensive, time consuming and have 
uncertain impact on the data. This is risky tactic because others will be able to construct better-
looking data, whilst expending fewer resources.  
Using this explanation, we can begin to reconcile what the two different sets of evidence are telling 
us. One set of evidence tells us that when people are set targets for performance, the data which 
measures that performance improves. The qualitative evidence gives us a set of reasons as to how 
this performance data improves – it is because those constructing it developed effective tactics to 
play the game well. 
There is one more task remaining in order to construct a story which encompasses both sets of 
evidence. It must account for why qualitative evidence from staff shows that they use 
gamesmanship but evidence of such is often absent from the performance data that is recorded. We 
can explain this by understanding the constructed nature of the quantitative data that has been 
analysed. The quantitative performance data is large-scale, but flattened through a process of 
abstraction. It is information from which the complexity has been stripped. It is produced by, and 
operates within, the logic of the game which has created it. As we have seen, this data construction 
process happens in many different ways: the decisions of senior managers to hire data manipulators 
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rather than people with skills in supporting those who are vulnerable (Soss, Fording and Schram 
2011: 221), the way in which support is structured to deter or ignore people who are ‘difficult’ 
(Newton 2012), decisions about which activities are to be prioritised (Rothstein 2008), and the way 
that frontline staff classify and record particular pieces of information (Soss, Fording and Schram 
2011: 209/10) . 
It is perfectly possible for those playing this game to produce performance information which 
matches the data analysed by Boyne and Chen (2006) and Kelman and Friedman (2009) and yet have 
undertaken the kind of behaviour uncovered by Soss, Fording and Schram (2011), Perrin (1998), 
Mayne (2007) and Politt (2013). Both Boyne and Chen (2006) and Kelman and Friedman (2009) use 
statistical analysis in order to find evidence of the kind of tactics uncovered in the qualitative 
interviews, but the fact they did not find patterns in the data which match their limited ‘gaming’ 
scenarios does not mean that such behaviour was not occurring, as they admit: “We do not claim 
that dysfunctional effects never occur; we note only that we find no evidence in this case” (Kelman 
and Friedman 2009; 938). 
To reconcile the two sets of evidence, we must say that those playing the game were able to use 
tactics to create that data in a way which was not apparent to those seeking to interpret a context-
stripped version of it. This should not be surprising. Those interpreting quantitative data from which 
context has been stripped will create new meanings for that data which may be radically different 
from the meanings given to it by those who created it.  
It is also important to understand that our explanatory framework suggests that tactics required to 
play the game well will look different in different contexts in which OBPM is employed. The greater 
the level of competition, and the greater the emphasis on PbR, the more the rational drivers of 
gamesmanship are felt. In these contexts, we would expect there to be less room for people’s values 
to hold sway. In other contexts, with lower levels of competition, with less risk from producing poor-
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looking numbers, and with greater ability to contextualise quantitative data with complex stories, 
the tactics are likely to be different. 
Conclusion 
We have explored the evidence both that OBPM improves performance data, and that it undermines 
effective practice. We have been able to reconcile these conflicting areas of evidence by exploring 
the theoretical underpinnings of OBPM, and, in particular, its reliance on a process of simplification 
and abstraction in measurement and attribution.  
These processes of simplification are required by OBPM in order to try and fit the complexities of life 
into its models. However, these processes turn the management of social interventions into a game, 
the rules of which reward the production of data. Playing this game well can involve genuine service 
improvements, but frequently leads to gamesmanship - tactics which focus on means of data 
production which do not meet client need.  
We have created an alternative way to understand ‘gaming’. Gaming is not ‘cheating’ within a 
system that otherwise works to improve services for those that need them. The entire OBPM system 
is a game which is abstracted and simplified from reality. The game measures “outcomes” which are 
different from how people experience the genuine impact of services and seeks to hold those who 
play it accountable for things they do not control. As a consequence, they develop tactics which 
focus their attention on data production, whilst finding opportunities to hold true to their values as 
best they can. 
The theoretical flaws in OBPM mean that this is not a technical problem that can be fixed. It is not a 
problem that can be fixed by better measurement, or better causal-chain modelling. In order to 
improve the performance of social interventions, we must move beyond the OBPM approach. If we 
want people to change their tactics, we must change the nature of the game itself. 
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